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FASHIONS FOUR CORPORATION, 
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a limited partnership, 







* * * * * * * * * * 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18164 
Respondent's (hereafter Fashions Four) brief 
description of the nature of the case is misleading in 
light of their four count complaint, which pled equitable 
and injunctive causes of action, breach of the lease 
agreement, and violation of Section 78-36-2, U.C.A. (1953) 
as amended. (R. 2-6). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWEF. COURT 
v~~t-.: ___ Four's review of the disposition in the Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lower court is substantially correct; however, it should 
be noted that the finding seized upon by Fashions Four is 
but one of 22 separate findings made by the lower court. 
(R. 199-204) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, (hereafter Fashion Place) disputes 
Fashions Four's version of the facts in a number of areas. 
For purposes of clarity, factual disputes are discussed 
in the context of the specific legal issues raised by the 
allegations. Statutory citations are to the Utah Code 
Annotated as amended. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JUDGMENT BEING APPEALED DOES NOT ARISE 
FROM STATUTORY FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
WITH THE RESULT THAT THE TIME FOR APPEAL 
IS NOT CONTROLLED BY SECTION 78-36-11. 
Fashions Four asserts that this Court lacks juris-
diction to hear this appeal on the grounds th.at Fashion Place 
did not file a notice of appeal within 10 days within the 
entry of judgment. Fashions Four's argument rests on 
Section 78-36-11: 
"78-36-11. Time for appeal. --Either party may. 
within 10 days, appeal from the judgment rendered." 
. 2. 
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Fashions Four's contention is totally without 
merit for the simple reason that the judgment appealed 
from does not arise under Section 78-36-2, the statutory 
provision relating to forcible entry and detainer. 
First, the complaint filed by Fashions Four pled 
at least four causes of action, only one of which alleged 
a breach of Section 78-36-2. Second, the action lacks 
the essential identifying characteristic of forcible entry 
and detainer actions as determined by previous decisions 
of this Court. Third, the judgment under review does 
not contain the critical element of relief which the 
forcible entry and detainer statute mandates must be 
present in judgments arising under the statute. Finally, 
the judgment contains elements of relief that are clearly 
impermissible under the forcible entry and detainer 
statute. 
At the outset, it should be noted that Plaintiff's 
four count complaint pled equitable and injunctive causes 
of action, breach of contract, and a claim for forcible 
entry and detainer. The findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and judgment entered herein make no specific reference 
to the counts pled. Thus it is not clear from which count(s) 
the judgment arose. 
. 3. 
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This Court has previously held that a plaintiff 
must comply with the provisions of Section 78-36-8 
in order to avail itself of the forcible entry and detainer 
statute. That section requires that the Court endorse 
upon the summons the number of days within which the 
defendant shall be required to appear and defend the 
action which shall not be. less than three days or more 
than 20 days from the date of service. Gerard vs. Young, 
20 Ut.2d 30, 432 P. 2d 343 (1967), is the controlling 
case. On appeal, the lessor contended that it was 
error for the trial court not to award the lessor treble 
damages under the forcible entry and detainer statute. 
This Court affirmed, stating: 
"In the first place, for a plaintiff to 
bring his case under the forcible entry and 
detainer statute, he must have the Court 
endorse upon the summons the number of days 
within which the defendant shall be required 
fo appear and defend the action, which shall 
be not less than three or more than 20 days 
from date of service." (Emphasis added). 
(Section 78-36-8) id. at 348. 
Gerard stands for the proposition that compliance 
with Section 78-36-8 is an essential element of any 
action genuinely arising under the forcible entry and 
detainer statute. Subsequent decisions have affirmed 
Gerard and held that compliance with Section 78-36-8 is 
determinative in deciding in whether an action arises 
.4. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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under the forcible entry and detainer statute. Vickery vs. 
Kiser, 556 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976); Pingree vs. Continental 
Group of Utah Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976). 
It is undisputed that Fashions Four failed to 
comply with the shortening of time provision of Section 
78-36-8. (R. 42). Having failed to comply with that 
provision, Fashions Four's judgment does not arise under 
the forcible entry and detainer statute, thus precluding 
application of the 10 day time limit for filing the notice 
of appeal. Fashions Four, having itself failed to strictly 
comply with the statute, should not be allowed to use 
the same statute to defeat Fashion Place's constitutionally 
recognized right of appeal. 
In addition to compliance with Section 78-36-8, 
another test exists for determining if a particular judgment 
is controlled by Section 78-36-11. The elements of a 
judgment arising under the forcible entry and detainer 
statute are controlled by a specific statutory section, 
Section 78-36-10. A judgment arising under the statute 
must contain the elements of relief specified in Section 
78-36-10, the relevant part of which reads: 
"78-36-10. Judgment -- of restitution; for damages 
and rent. -- If upon the trial the verdict of 
the jury, or if the case is tried without a 
jury, the finding of the Court, is in favor 
of the plaintiff and against the defen~ant? 
jud~ent shall be ente~ed for ~he restitution 
Oft e premises; ... (Emphasis added) 
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The emphasis of the entire forcible entry and 
-detainer action, including Section 78-36-10 is on 
restitution, putting a dispossessed tenant back into 
possession. 78-36-10 mandates that a judgment in favor 
of a plaintiff award restitution. A judgment not awarding 
restitution falls outside the parameters of the statute 
according to previous decisions of this Court. Belnap vs. Fox 
251 P. 1073 (Utah 1927) is the controlling case in this 
jurisdiction. In that action the Court noted that the 
defendant had surrendered possession of the premises 
in issue to the plaintiff prior to trial. The opinion 
holds that because restitution of the premises was not 
an issue at trial, the 10 day appeal filing period was not 
applicable, and the time for appeal was in fact controlled 
by the general appeal statute. 
The judgment obtained in the instant action does 
not award restitution of the premises to plaintiff. (R: 207-2( 
Restitution was not ordered because Fashions Four had been 
in actual possession of the premises for more than two months 
prior to trial and for more than four months prior to the 
entry of judgment. (R. 201, Finding 13). The issue of 
restitution Has thus moot at the time of trial and entry 
of judgment. Under Belnap, the omission of restitution 
from the judgment places that judgment outside the class 
of statutory judgments controlled by the shortened notice 
of appeal provisions. Belnap stands for the principle that 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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I'. 
1' 
fairness is best served by requiring that both parties 
meet the same standard of strict statutory compliance 
before applying the special appeal provisions of Section 
78-36-11. That conclusion is further supported by the 
fact that the judgment below includes elements of relief 
clearly impermissible under Section 78-36-10. 
In addition to money damages, the lower court's 
judgment awarded Fashions Four injunctive relief, in the 
form of a permanent injunction prohibiting Fashion Place 
from interfering with their occupancy and possession of 
the premises in dispute, and declaratory relief in the 
form of a finding that Plaintiff was entitled to possession 
under the terms of the original lease agreement. (R. 208). 
The relief thus awarded appears to be equitable 
and declaratory in nature. Both elements are legitimate 
items of relief under the U.R.C.P., but judgments arising 
under the Utah.Forcible Entry and Detainer Act are controlled 
by Section 78-36-10. The full text of Section 78-36-10 
is attached hereto as Appendix A. A review of Section 78-36-10 
reveals no provision for the award of general equitable or 
declaratory relief in statutory actions. Thus, the judgment 
awarded Fashions Four could not arise under the forcible 
entry and detainer statute, and thus the shortened time for 
appeal provisions do not apply . 
. 7. 
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The controlling case in this jurisdiction is 
Ottenheimer vs. Mountain States Supply Co., 55 Ut. 190, 
188 P. 1117 (1920). The applicability of the shortened 
time provision of Section 78-36-11 was the issue before 
the Court. The Court held that the shortened time 
provisions did not apply, stating that the relief sought 
and obtained by the plaintiffs under their second cause 
of action was purely equitable, and could not be obtained 
in a forcible entry and detainer under the statute. 
Ottenheimer was affirmed by this Court in Brandley vs. Lewis, 
92 P.2d 338, (Utah 1939). 
In summary, the action pursued by the Plaintiff 
and the judgment in fact obtained failed in every important 
respect to contain the prerequisite elements of statutory 
forcible entry or detainer cases. First, the complaint 
itself pled four causes of action, only one of which involved 
the statutory claim. Second, the Plaintiff failed to 
comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 78-36-8 
in regard to shortening the time to appear and defend 
forcible entry and/or detainer actions. 
Third, the judgment itself as entered lacks an 
essential element which the statute itself mandates must 
be present in any judgment arising under the statute, 
restition of the premises. Finally, the relief in fact 
obtained could not be properly awarded under the provisions 
o f the s ta tut e . 
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These deficiencies put the judgment under appeal 
clearly outside the statutory parameters of forcible 
entry and detainer actions, and thus outside the application 
of Section 78-36-11 as regards the shortened time for 
appeal. The assertion of jurisdiction by this Court over 
this appeal is entirely consistent with prior Utah case law. 
POINT II 
THE JUNE 11 REASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
FROM NORSAL TO FASHIONS FOUR IS VOID BECAUSE 
THE CONSENT OF THE LESSOR AS REQUIRED BY THE 
LEASE WAS NOT OBTAINED. THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN FINDING THAT CONSENT WAS NOT REQUIRED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
On June 11, 1981 Norsal reassigned the lease 
agreement to the prior tenant, Fashions Four. (R.201, 
Finding Nos. 12 and 13). That reassignment was made 
without the knowledge or consent of Fashion Place, (R. 204, 
Conclusion No. 2), in apparent violation of Article 15 of 
the lease agreement, which requires lessor's consent to 
any assignment. (R. 20). 
The crux of the lower court decision is the 
conclusion that the consent of the lessor, Fashion Place, 
was not required for the June 11 reassignment. (R. 204, 
Conclusion No. 3). The finding that Fashions Four had 
a possessory interest in the lease which was violated by 
. 9. 
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Fashion Place (R. 201, Finding Nos. 12 and 13), rests 
entirely on the validity of the reassignment. 
The trial court's conclusion that Fashion Place's 
consent was not required as a matter of law is derived 
from a line of three cases apparently holding that the 
consent provisions of written lease agreements do not 
apply to reassignments to an original lessee. The first 
case in that series is McCormick vs. Stowell, 138 Mass. 431 
(Mass. 1885). 
At the outset, it should be noted that McCormick 
did not involve a dispute over possession. In :McCormick, 
the lessee brought an action against the lessor based 
on a claim that the lessor had failed to heat the 
premises as agreed. The lessor raised the claim of an 
assignment without consent as an affirmative defense 
barring the introduction of evidence that would support 
the lessee's claim that the lessor had failed to heat 
the premises. 
The opinion holds that it was proper for the 
trial court to allow evidence regarding the lessor's failure 
to heat the premises. In arriving at that holding, the 
Massachusetts court noted that the assignment back was 
not a breach, because lease provisions requiring the 
written consent of the lessor for assignment do not apply 
to a reassignment to the lessee . 
. 10. 
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The source then of Fashions Four's contention that 
the consent to assignment provisions of written lease agree-
ments do not apply to reassignments to an original lessee 
lies in the unsupported dicta of an 1885 Massachusetts' 
action which did not raise the issue of possession. 
The McCormick dicta was repeated with approval 6~- years 
later in the next case relied upon by Plaintiff, Coulas vs. 
Desimone, 208 P. 2d 105 (Wash. 1949). Again, it should 
be noted at the outset that Coulos does not raise an issue 
of possession. 
Coulos was an action for money damages arising out 
of a claim of constructive eviction brought by the original 
lessee, Coulos, against the lessor's predecessor in interest, 
Desimone. Desimone raised the issue of a reassignment without 
consent as an affirmative defense to the constructive eviction 
claim. The Washington court, relying on McCormick, held 
that the reassignment was not a defense to the constructive 
eviction claim. 
The final case in this series relied upon by Plaintiff 
is Shoemaker vs. Shaug, 490 P.2d 439 (Wash. App. 1971). Un-
like McCormick and Coulos, Shoemaker does involve a 
possession issue. Shoemaker, an assignee of the original 
lessee, bought the action seeking to avoid a termination of 
the lease by lessor Shaug on the grounds that there had been 
an assignment without the lessor's consent. Specifically, 
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Shoemaker as part of an anticipated sale of the business 
operated on the leasehold premises, had assigned the lease 
to a corporation created by himself and the proposed 
purchaser. When the purchase fell through, Shoemaker 
had the corporation reassign the lease back to himself. 
Lessor Shaug sought to terminate the lease on the 
grounds that there had been as assignment without the lessor's 
consent as required by the lease agreement. The trial 
court, with substantial misgivings as noted in the opinion, 
declared a forfeiture and terminated the lease. 
The appellate court reversed, pointing out that 
forfeitures are not favored as a matter of law, and that 
equity will step in to prevent an inequitable forfeiture. 
The court sites McCormick and Coulas in support of those 
general propositions. Because neither Coulas nor McCormick 
involved a possession dispute, the Court's reliance 
on those two cases seems misplaced. 
In addition to the analytical weaknesses of the 
cases described above, those cases are readily distinguishable 
from the facts before this Court. First and most important, 
the right to possession, which is the gravamen of this 
litigation, was simply not at issue in McCormick nor Coulas. 
Second, the instant action involves premises located 
in a large regional shopping center where the lessor has 
contractual relationships with a large number of tenants, and 
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is obligated to operate the entire facility in such a way 
as to provide the maximum benefit to all tenants. In contrast, 
all of Fashions Four's cases involve simple bilateral relation-
ships between a single lessor and a single lessee. 
The primary issue in the instant action is whether 
the explicit la~guage of Article 15 of the lease agreement 
will be enforced. That clause states in part: 
"Any attempted transfer, assignment, subletting, 
license or concession agreement, change of 
ownership or hypothecation without the land-
lord's written consent shall be void and 
confer no rights upon any third person. 
(R. 20). " 
The contract language could hardly be more 
straightforward. Applied to the facts of the instant 
action, it simply means that Norsal's June 11 reassignment 
of the lease agreement to Fashions Four, the lynchpin of 
Fashions Four's entire case, fails to transfer any rights, 
possessory or otherwise, back to Fashions Four because the 
consent of the landlord to the assignment was not obtained. 
As indicated in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, freely 
negotiated contracts between sophisticated commercial 
parties should not be ignored or set aside, absent fraud 
or unconscionability, neither of which are present in this 
action. Fashions Four has simply argued that because the 
contract does not meet their needs after the fact, it must 
be modified by Court fiat. In support of that contention, 
Fashions Four relies upon case law that is analytically 
defective. in contravention of good public policy, and 
""' 
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distinguishable from the case herein. 
POINT III 
FASHION PLACE DID NOT WAIVE THE APPLICATION OF 
THE CONSENT TO ASSIGNMENT PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 
15 AS REGARDS THE JUNE 11 REASSIGNMENT. 
Fashions Four contends that as regards the June 11 
reassignment back to Fashions Four, Fashion Place waived 
application of the consent to assignment provisions of 
Article 15 because those provisions were not followed in two 
earlier transactions involving the lease. That contention 
is without merit. 
Assuming arguendo that the consent provisions were 
actually not followed in the earlier transactions, no 
waiver would result under the express provisions of 
Article 22 of the lease agreement, the last paragraph 
of which reads as follows: 
"The waiver by landlord of any breach of any 
terin, covenant or condition herein contained 
shall not be deemed to be a waiver of such 
term, covenant or condition or of any subsequent 
breach of the same or any other term, covenant 
or condition herein contained. The subseouent 
acceptance of rent hereunder by landlord shall 
not be deemed to be waiver of any preceding 
breach by tenant of any term, covenant or 
condition of this lease, other than the failure 
of tenant to pay the particular rentals so 
accepted, regardless of landlord's knowledge of 
such preceding breach at the time of acceptance 
of such rent. No covenant, term, or condition 
of this lease shall be deemed to have been waived 
by landlord, unless such waiver be in writing by 
landlord. " (R. 30) . 
In support of its waiver arguments, Fashions Four 
cites Hendrickson vs. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205, (Alaska 1980). 
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In fact, that case supports Fashion Place's contention that 
no waiver occurred. In that case, the Alaska court rejects 
a claim of waiver as to a particular assignment in the 
following language: 
"Although we have found that Hendrickson did 
give notice of his intent to enforce the terms 
of the lease, this principle need not be applied 
in the instant case to support our holding. 
In Stevens vs. State, 501 P. 2d 759, 762 (Alaska 
1972}, we held that where a lease contains a 
non-waiver provision, previous failures to 
cancel for a breach of a covenant do not 
constitute a waiver, and the landlord may 
demand strict compliance with a lease 
provision without giving such prior notice. 
The Hall-Young lease contains such a non-
waiver clause which provided that 'waiver by 
lessor of any breach of any term, covenant 
or condition . . . shall not be deemed to be 
a waiver of such tenn.' Hendrickson 211 footnote 
6 •II 
In view of the non-waiver clause cited above, it 
appears certain that the Alaska court would have enforced the 
contract language, which is exactly what Fashion Place 
contends the Court should do in the instant action. 
It should also be noted that Fashions Four 
concedes in its brief that no waiver arises where a lessor 
puts an assignee on notice that strict compliance will be 
required. 
At trial, it was the undisputed testimony of Mr. 
Elgin Williams, Plaintiff and chief executive officer of 
Fashions Four, that in April of 1981 he met with Tom Estes, 
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the general manager of Fashion Place Mall, and was told 
·that in order for Fashions Four to regain possession of the 
premises, a new lease would have ~o be renegotiated. (T. 40). 
Thus, Fashions Four had actual notice that the landlord 
would demand strict compliance with the lease provisions. 
The transactions out of which the alleged waivers 
arise, also deserve brief examination. The first 
transfer was the assignment from Fashions Four to Norsal 
in 1978. As indicated in the findings on file herein, 
Fashion Place in fact consented to that assignment. (R.200, 
Finding No. 9). A waiver will not arise from the undisputed 
exercise of the consent requirement. 
Fashions Four also claims that a waiver arose from 
a second transfer in November of 1979, at which time all 
the stock of Norsal Development Corporation was sold to 
Neil Davidson. Fashion Place was given no notice whatsoever 
of that transaction at the time it occurred. Fashion 
Place could not waive its right to consent to that transaction 
where it had no notice of the transfer and no opportunity 
to exercise its right to consent. 
Fashions Four's contention that Fashion Place 
waived its right to consent to the June 11 reassignment 
will simply not stand where the written lease itself contains 
an explicit non-waiver provision; where Fashions Four had 
.16. 
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actual notice that the landlord would require strict 
compliance; and where the transaction supposedly raising 
the waiver were either consented to by Fashion Place, or 
kept from Fashion Place's knowledge. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, the trial court erred in failing to 
apply and enforce the clear language of the lease agreement 
requiring the lessor's consent to any assignment of the 
lease. For that reason, Fashion Place respectfully 
requests that the trial court judgment be reversed, the 
case remanded, and that the trial court be directed to 
enter judgment in favor of Fashion Place, and to hold 
further proceedings on the amount of damages sustained by 
Fashion Place under its counterclaim . 
. ..--
DATED this day of November, 1982. 
GREEN, HIGGINS & BERRY 
Raymond Scott Berry\ 
Attorney for Appeflant 
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APPENDIX A 
"78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages and 
rent -- Inrrnediate enforcement. If upon the trial 
the verdict of the jury, or if the case is tried 
without a jury, the finding of the court, is in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, 
judgment shall be entered for the restitution of 
the premises; andif the proceeding is for unlawful 
detainer after neglect or failure to perform any 
condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, or after default in the 
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. The jury, or 
the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury, 
shall also assess the damages occasioned to the 
plaintiff by any forcible entry, or by any 
forcible or unlawful detainer, and any amount found 
due the plaintiff by reason of waste of the premises 
by the defendant during the tenancy, alleged in the 
complaint and proved on the trial, and find the 
amount of any rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer is after default in the payment of rent; 
and the judgment shall be rendered against the 
defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible 
or unlawful detainer, for the rent and for three 
times the amount of the damages thus assessed. 
When the proceeding is for an unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the 
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry 
of the judgment. In all cases the judgment may. be 
enforced immediately." 
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AFFIDAVIT OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) as. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
______ P_h_i_l __ D_y_e_r ___________ ~, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is employed in the offices of GREEN, HIGGINS 
& BERRY, attorney for Appellant, Defendant 
~----------------~~~~~-~~~~~~ 
herein; that he served the attached 
Reply Brief of Appellant 
upon E.H. Fankhauser 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope 
addressed to: 
E.H. Fankhauser 
Attorney at Law 
660 South 200 East #105 
Salt Lake City 1 Utah 84111 
and hand delivering the same· to the above address 
on the 15th day of __ N __ ov_e_m_b_e_r __ ~~~~~-' 1982. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
November 
-----------------· 1982. 
15th day of 
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